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Marijuana Business Attorneys and the 
Professional Deference Standard 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you practice as an attorney in the State of 
Arkansas.  A client solicits your advice about opening a marijuana 
dispensary or cultivation center.1  The client might want you to 
assist him in filing a dispensary application with the State.  On 
the other hand, she might want you to negotiate a commercial 
lease or to provide services to ensure compliance with municipal 
zoning laws.  Although Arkansas voters approved a constitutional 
amendment permitting medical marijuana sales,2 you provide a 
clear warning to your client: possessing, manufacturing, selling, 
and distributing marijuana remains a federal crime.3  After these 
precautions, however, you proceed to business as usual, providing 
a routine legal service just as you would for any other client. 
This hypothetical prompts an important question.  Even 
when a legal service is permissible under state law, are lawyers 
    J.D. Candidate ‘19.  The author thanks Carol Rose Goforth, Clayton N. Little Professor 
of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for her thoughtful advice and guidance.  The 
author also thanks Jordan Blair Woods, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas 
School of Law, for leading him to an invaluable resource.  Finally, the author thanks his 
family for their continued support during the writing process. 
1. In March 2018, a Circuit Court judge enjoined Arkansas’ Medical Marijuana
Commission from issuing cultivation permits.  See Arkansas Supreme Court to hear medical 
marijuana case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 7, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/3305440416974708b9fda59938cf9332 [https://perma.cc/PZE7-KKU3] 
(also available at http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/may/07/arkansas-supreme-
court-hear-medical-marijuana-case/ [https://perma.cc/PC7N-AQ7V]). The Arkansas 
Supreme Court reinstated the licensing process when it reviewed this matter on appeal.  See 
Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, at 10, 549 S.W.3d 
901, 908. 
2. 2016 General Election and Nonpartisan Runoff Election Results, Official County
Results, Issue No. 6: Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016, ARK. SEC’Y OF 
STATE (Feb. 28, 2017, 1:08 PM), 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/63912/184685/Web01/en/summary.html 
[https://perma.cc/FJ2M-7FSU]. 
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 (b)(1), 812(c)(c)(10), 841(a)(1) (2012).
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criminally liable under federal law for providing services to 
marijuana-related clients (“MRCs”)?  In many cases, the answer 
is probably yes.4  During the Obama Administration, federal 
enforcement of marijuana laws was primarily a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion.5  The Ogden Memo, released by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in October 2009, instructed 
federal prosecutors to refrain from focusing “federal 
resources . . . on individuals whose actions are in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws.”6  A 
subsequent 2013 memorandum, known as the Cole Memo, stated 
that the DOJ would not challenge state marijuana laws so long as 
the state laws did not interfere with federal enforcement priorities, 
which included: 
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to 
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is 
legal under state law in some form to other states; 
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being 
used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal 
drugs or other illegal activity; 
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana; 
Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with 
marijuana use; 
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the 
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by 
marijuana production on public lands; and 
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.7 
4. Infra Sections I.B., I.C.
5. See generally Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden on
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana to 
Selected United States Attorneys, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y 
GEN., at 1-2 (Oct. 19, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BY25-63T5]. 
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James M. Cole on Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Enforcement to All United States Attorneys, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF 
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After these memos were issued, the United States 
experienced the birth of a rapidly growing commercial marijuana 
industry.  Currently, thirty states and the District of Columba have 
legalized medical or recreational marijuana.8  In 2016, consumers 
spent approximately $6.7 billion on marijuana, and market 
researchers project that sales will reach $20.2 billion by 2021.9  
Like any other business, MRCs require legal assistance for a 
variety of issues,10 yet they cannot operate as traditional business 
entities.  Federal law restricts their access to banking services,11 
contract enforcement remains unpredictable,12 and MRCs bear 
heavier tax burdens because of their status as drug traffickers.13  
Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for MRCs to obtain federal 
legal protection from courts regarding potential bankruptcy and 
intellectual property issues.14 
THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., at 1-2 (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PYV-G4XG]. 
8. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (June 6, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3Q6S-96DF]  
 (providing a state-by-state guide of current medical marijuana laws and programs). 
9. Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Sales Totaled $6.7 Billion In 2016, FORBES (Jan. 3,
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/03/marijuana-sales-
totaled-6-7-billion-in-2016/#32a2f2d175e3 [https://perma.cc/6NGE-UJHC]. 
10. See Ally Marotti, As Marijuana gains acceptance, law firms cultivate new pot-
specific practices, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2017, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-medical-marijuana-lawyers-0420-biz-
20170418-story.html [https://perma.cc/7WSA-LSZJ]. 
11. Daniel J. Beck, Banking and Medical Marijuana in Arkansas – It’s Still Illegal,
THE ARK. BANKER 12, at 8 (Dec. 2016), http://www.qgtlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Banking-Medical-Marijuana-in-Arkansas-DJB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UJ4H-M2TP]. 
12. See, e.g., Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, Nos. CV2011-051310, CV2011-
051311, 2012 WL 12874349, at *3 (Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct.. Apr. 17, 2012). 
13. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012); see, e.g., Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States,
894 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2018) (dispensary unsuccessfully sought tax refund after the 
IRS denied the dispensary’s request for business tax deductions); see also Peter J. Reilly, 
Marijuana Industry Faces Challenging Tax Regime, FORBES (July 19, 2018, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2018/07/19/marijuana-industry-faces-
challenging-tax-regime/#122a17f52174 [https://perma.cc/VE4Y-X325].   
14. See, e.g., In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 847 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015) (stating that a
debtor in the marijuana business could not obtain relief in federal bankruptcy court); Sam 
Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark Laundering, Useless Patents, and Other IP Challenges 
For the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. L. REV. 217, 220 (2016) (“Because the bulk of IP law 
is federal, the federal marijuana prohibition means that much of IP law is unavailable or 
effectively inaccessible to the marijuana industry. Worse yet, marijuana businesses are 
denied the regulatory benefits of IP law while remaining subject to its burdens.”).   
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Essentially these restrictions recognize that, within the eyes 
of the law, the actions of medical and recreational marijuana 
businesses are considered criminal conduct.15  Federal law 
designates marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).16  This means that all uses of marijuana 
(except for government research)17 are criminalized.18  Schedule 
I classification denotes drugs that presumably have a high 
potential for abuse with no accepted medical benefit.19  Because 
marijuana remains a Schedule I drug, many attorneys justifiably 
fear that providing legal services and advice to MRCs (although 
permissible under state law) might subject them to criminal 
liability.  In January 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
rescinded the non-enforcement memorandums from the Obama 
Administration, evidencing potential governmental intent to 
enforce federal marijuana laws.20 
 Potential criminal liability creates a chilling effect on 
attorneys wishing to provide legal services to MRCs.21  
Professional legal ethics rules dictate that attorneys cannot 
counsel clients to engage in criminal conduct.22  Regardless of 
these concerns, the legal community now faces an ethical 
conundrum facilitated by federalism.  State law might invite an 
attorney to provide her services to an MRC, yet federal criminal 
law lingers in the background.  The current legal landscape needs 
a standard of liability allowing attorneys to provide their services 
when doing so is permitted by state law.  At the same time, an 
applicable standard must be tempered by the fact that several 
states have not legalized medical or recreational marijuana. 
15. Erwin Chemerisnky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 97 (2015).  
16. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2012).
17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 872(a), (e) (2012).
18. Helia Garrido Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics In The
Movement To Legalize Marijuana, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 333, 335 (2014).  
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
20. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions on Marijuana Enforcement
to All United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN. 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download 
[https://perma.cc/UDG3-TZD2].  
21. See Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 
202 (2016).   
22.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016). 
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Two cases from the United States Supreme Court’s 2009 
term addressed restrictions similar to those faced by marijuana 
attorneys.23  Both Milavetz v. United States (“Milavetz”)24 and 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“Humanitarian Law 
Project”)25 spurred questions on whether the First Amendment 
protects legal services and attorney advice.26  Although neither 
case directly confronted this question, 27 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the practice of law seems to incorporate 
elements of both speech and conduct28—meaning that the legal 
profession receives some degree of First Amendment 
protection.29 
This article proposes that attorneys dealing with MRCs 
might rely on the First Amendment as a source of protection.  A 
coherent attorney advice standard is needed as states continue to 
experiment with marijuana legalization.30  At the core of adopting 
a workable standard is the fact that attorney services maintain a 
special and elevated status due to their relationship with 
governmental power.31  Legal services enable MRCs to either 
invoke the protection of the law, or to avoid the power of the 
government.32  For example, the transactional attorney protects 
and secures her clients’ property rights.33  Litigators file court 
23. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-27 (2010); Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 232 (2010). 
24. 559 U.S. at 232.
25. 561 U.S. at 25-27. 
26. See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 639, 641-48 (2011); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 
1238, 1262-64 (2016); Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory For Protecting 
Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 30 (2011). 
27. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1277, 1284 (2005); see also Tarkington, supra note 26, at 30.   
28. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010) (stating that it
would be an extreme position to categorize attorney advice as conduct). 
29. The question as to how much protection is provided remains undecided.  See 
Tarkington, supra note 26, at 36. 
30. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 36; see Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to
Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1034 (2016) (“Just as the Court 
has narrowly cabined restrictions on crime-advocating speech . . . so courts need to come up 
with rules indicating which restrictions on crime-facilitating speech are permissible and 
which are forbidden.”). 
31. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 37. 
32. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 38. 
33. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 40-41. 
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documents on behalf of their clients to enforce rights and 
challenge the application of existing laws.34  Administrative law 
attorneys assist their clients in petitioning the government.35 
The standard of liability proposed in this article advocates 
for judicial deference to state ethics rules.  This article will refer 
to the proposed standard as the “professional deference standard.”  
First, the professional deference standard would only apply in 
jurisdictions where there is a conflict between state and federal 
marijuana laws.  Second, it would only apply when an attorney’s 
services comply with applicable state ethics rules.36  The author 
realizes the professional deference standard is in tension with 
federal marijuana laws, which is why Part I of this article 
addresses the contours of federal criminal liability and focuses on 
the prospect of providing legal services and advice to MRCs.  In 
spite of this tension, the Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project 
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has wrestled with 
circumstances where statutory law prohibits attorneys from 
providing legal services.37  Part II, therefore, briefly explains why 
34. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 38. 
35. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 62-63. The right to petition one’s government
extends to administrative agencies and courts.  See California Motor Transport Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all 
departments of the Government.  The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect 
of the right of petition.”).  
36. Several rule-making bodies in medical and recreational jurisdictions have been
reluctant to modify ethics rules that would permit attorneys to represent MRCs.  See, e.g., 
Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available at 
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134 
[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics 
Comm’n, Op. 215 (2017) (available at 
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620 
[https://perma.cc/ZMZ8-RJSS]); see also Justice J. Brooks, The Ethics of Representing 
Marijuana-Related Businesses, 52 THE ARK. LAWYER 2, 22 (Spring 2017) (available at 
http://www.qgtlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/The-Ethics-of-Representing-
Marijuana-Related-Business-JJB.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8HK-L4QU]) (noting that while 
Arizona’s Ethics Commission interpreted its ethics rules to permit marijuana business 
services, Ohio’s Board of Professional Conduct Committee expressly came to a different 
conclusion).   
37.  See cases cited infra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text; Legal Servs. Corp. 
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (holding that a statute prohibiting government
funded attorneys from challenging the validity of existing welfare laws “exclude[s] from
litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their
nature are within the province of the courts to consider”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436-
39 (1978) (overturning reprimand of an ACLU attorney when she was disciplined for
soliciting clients to pursue litigation as a mechanism of political advocacy); NAACP v.
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attorney advice is deserving of constitutional protection.  It also 
examines the Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of 
deference to professional ethics standards.  Although the Court 
has expressed its disfavor for statutes that insulate certain issues 
from legal challenges,38 this inconsistency is apparent by 
comparing Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project.  In Milavetz, 
the Court held that a bankruptcy provision prohibiting attorneys 
from advising clients to acquire additional debt (before filing for 
bankruptcy) could not be read in a way to prohibit such advice 
when rendered to help clients achieve lawful purposes.39  
However, the Humanitarian Law Project decision charted a 
different course.  The Court upheld a statute that categorically 
prohibited attorneys from providing their services to foreign 
terrorist organizations, even when the services were provided for 
otherwise lawful means such as seeking humanitarian aid and 
negotiating peace treaties.40 
The Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project decisions 
demonstrate the Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of 
deferring to professional ethics standards.41  Accordingly, 
reliance on professional standards is far from a slam-dunk defense 
for marijuana business attorneys.  But in light of the fact that most 
routine legal services seem to violate federal criminal law when 
provided to MRCs,42 the First Amendment could and should 
provide a conceivable defense.  For that reason, Part III explains 
why courts should recognize the professional deference standard.  
As applied to legal advice and services rendered to MRCs, 
adoption of the professional deference standard would allow 
attorneys to provide their services without fear of federal 
prosecution, and it would protect attorneys within medical and 
recreational marijuana jurisdictions.  Most importantly, it would 
provide clarity to the pressing issue of when an attorney can 
represent an MRC. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (“We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its 
affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under 
its power to regulate the legal profession . . . .”).   
38. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47. 
39. See case cited infra Section II.B and accompanying text (emphasis added).
40. See case cited infra Section II.C and accompanying text.
41. See cases cited infra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text.
42. Infra Section I and accompanying text.
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I. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Manufacturing, distributing, or selling marijuana constitutes 
a felony under federal law.43  Violating the CSA can incur a 
maximum penalty of five years and a $250,000 fine.44  Entities 
are fined $1 million for violating the CSA.45  If more than one 
thousand kilograms or one thousand marijuana plants are 
involved in a CSA violation, the offense can carry a mandatory 
minimum penalty of ten years and maximum fines of $10 million 
for individuals or $50 million for non-individuals.46  Currently, a 
congressional appropriations rider provides limited protection to 
those associated with legalized marijuana operations.47  However, 
the rider is a funding mechanism that does not displace 
substantive federal law.48  MRCs are still likely to engage in 
activities that violate the CSA.  Because of this fact, attorneys 
remain subject to potential liability as accomplices and co-
conspirators for providing MRC services.49 
A. THE ROHRABACHER AMENDMENT
The Rohrabacher Amendment is a congressional 
appropriations rider that prohibits the DOJ from prosecuting 
marijuana activities if an MRC’s actions comply with applicable 
state laws.50  This provision only applies to medical marijuana 
43. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2012).
45. See id. 
46. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012).
47. TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53, §§ 
101(a)(2), 103, 129 Stat. 502, 505-06 (2015) (providing appropriations as specified for 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 
128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)). 
48. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).
49. Accomplice and conspiracy liability are distinct and separate crimes.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Suppose someone who admired 
criminals and hated the police learned that the police were planning a raid on a drug ring, 
and, hoping to foil the raid and assure the success of the ring, warned its members—with 
whom he had had no previous, or for that matter subsequent, dealings—of the impending 
raid. He would be an aider and abettor of the drug conspiracy, but not a member of it.” (citing 
United States v. Lane, 514 F.2d 22, 27 (9th Cir. 1975))). 
50. TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53, §§ 
101(a)(2), 103, 129 Stat. 502, 505-06 (2015) (providing appropriations as specified for 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 
128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)). 
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operations—it does not apply to recreational marijuana.51  In 
2016, the Ninth Circuit buttressed protection derived from the 
Rohrabacher Amendment.  It held that the DOJ could not 
prosecute state-approved cultivators and sellers who were in strict 
compliance with state law.52  In order to determine whether the 
defendants complied with state law, the Court stated that 
establishing a medical marijuana prosecution would require an 
evidentiary hearing.53  Despite this protection, the Court noted 
that the Rohrabacher Amendment merely provided temporary 
protection against criminal prosecution.54  Congress could, at any 
moment in time, authorize funds to prosecute medical marijuana 
crimes.55 
The Rohrabacher Amendment does not provide a predictable 
safeguard against criminal prosecution.  Its continuation is 
contingent upon congressional reauthorization,56 and Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions is an outspoken critic of the amendment.57  
Repeal of the amendment would probably allow the DOJ to 
pursue federal prosecution.58  Attorneys should, therefore, be 
aware of the potential to incur criminal liability as a result of 
providing legal representation to MRCs. 
51. Id. 
52. McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1178.
53. Id. at 1179. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56.  At the present moment, the Rohrabacher Amendment is set to expire on September
30, 2018.  See Trump signs spending bill that includes medical marijuana protections, 
MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Mar. 23, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/trump-signs-
spending-bill-includes-medical-marijuana-protections/; see also United States v. McIntosh, 
833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016). (“Congress could appropriate funds for . . . [marijuana] 
prosecutions tomorrow.”). 
57. Matt Ferner, Senators Defy Jeff Sessions And Vote To Extend Medical Marijuana
Protections, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senators-vote-to-extend-medical-marijuana-
protections-in-defiance-of-jeff-sessions_us_597a4177e4b02a4ebb7420a1 
[https://perma.cc/WV49-GGAS] (quoting Jeff Sessions: “I believe it would be unwise for 
Congress to restrict the discretion of the Department to fund particular prosecutions, 
particularly in the midst of an historic drug epidemic and potentially long-term uptick in 
violent crime.”).  
58. See, e.g., United States v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 
1039, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[A]s long as Congress precludes the Department of Justice 
from expending funds in the manner proscribed by Section 538 [of the Continuing 
Appropriations Act], the permanent injunction will only be enforced against MAMM insofar 
as that organization is in violation of California [s]tate laws . . . .”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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B. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
Federal aiding and abetting law imposes liability on those 
who assist in the commission of others’ crimes.  It contains two 
components: a defendant must (1) take an affirmative act in 
furtherance of the principal’s underlying offense, and (2) she must 
act with the intent to facilitate the commission of the principal’s 
crime.59  Although aiders and abettors do not commit the actual 
underlying criminal offense, the aiding and abetting statute 
punishes defendants as if they were principals, i.e., the 
perpetrators of the actual crime.60  The statute states that 
“[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, 
is punishable as a principal.”61  Because this provision eliminates 
the distinction between the principals and the accomplice,62 
attorneys who counsel their clients in violation of the CSA could 
be punished in the same manner as their clients.63 
The statute does not require aiders or abettors to participate 
in every aspect of a principal’s crime.64  Participation in any part 
of a CSA violation may be sufficient to establish aiding and 
abetting liability.65  In helping the principal commit a criminal 
offense, aiders and abettors must possess a sufficiently culpable 
mental state.66  They need to have advanced knowledge of the fact 
that a principal will commit a criminal offense.67  Such 
knowledge would provide the defendant with sufficient notice to 
refrain from participating in an activity that assists the principal.68 
In light of the intent requirement, courts have struggled to 
determine whether convicting an aider and abettor requires a 
standard of actual knowledge or purpose.69  An actual knowledge 
59. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
61. Id. 
62. See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking? The Mental State of the Aider and
Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2002). 
63. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii), 841(b)(1)(D) (2012).
64. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1247. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1248.
67. Id. at 1249.
68. Id. 
69. See Weiss, supra note 63 at 1378; see also G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, 
Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, 
Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1410-
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standard (i.e., knowing assistance or encouragement) means that 
prosecutors must merely look to see if the defendant possessed 
knowledge that her activity would facilitate an illegal action.70  
Under this standard, a blameworthy state of mind is often implicit 
in the fact that the defendant associated with the principal in a 
criminal activity.71  On the other hand, the traditional formulation 
for the purpose-based standard requires: (1) that a defendant 
associated herself with an illegal venture, (2) that she participated 
in the venture as something she wished to bring about, and (3) 
that she desired to make the venture succeed.72 
There is very little authority addressing when a lawyer’s 
involvement in an illegal action constitutes liability under aiding 
and abetting law.73  As with any regular business, MRCs need 
attorneys for a range of services.  Examples include negotiating 
contracts and leasehold agreements, as well as compliance with 
municipal zoning laws and administrative regulations.74  
Culpability that merely requires knowledge would be easy to 
establish in each of these situations because an attorney will likely 
know that her services enable clients to commit a CSA 
violation.75  For example, negotiating a lease for a marijuana 
business most likely reflects the attorney’s knowledge that his 
client desires to either grow, possess, sell, or distribute 
11 (1996) (“The course of judicial decisions on the meaning of ‘willfully’ does not run 
straight.”); Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Justice Kagan Writes a Primer on Aiding and 
Abetting Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-justice-kagan-writes-a-primer-on-
aiding-and-abetting-law/ [https://perma.cc/HVF6-YQT2] (“[W]hether a defendant must 
have ‘knowledge’ or ‘purpose’ to facilitate the crime is not clearly answered . . . .”). 
70. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 69, at 1411-13. 
71. See Kit Kinports, Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 133, 136 (2015). 
72. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
73.  Jens David Olin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 212 n.118 (2002).
74. See generally Mark J. Fucile, The Intersection of Professional Duties and Federal
Law as States Decriminalize Marijuana, 23 THE PROF. LAW. 1, 3 (2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/professional_lawyer/volume_2
3_number_1/ABA_PLN_v023n01_003_the_intersection_of_professional_duties_and_fede
ral_law_as_states_decriminalize_marijuana.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF2L-
FWHK]. A mistaken belief that a client’s conduct is lawful will not help a defendant escape 
aiding and abetting liability.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 167 
(5th ed. 2009).  
75. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. 
L. REV. 869, 903 (2013).
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marijuana.76  To put it simply, the attorney probably knows that 
her client is utilizing the space for those very purposes,77 and it is 
irrelevant as to whether she intends for her client to violate the 
CSA. 
In comparison to a mere knowledge standard, a standard 
requiring purpose examines if the aider and abettor engaged in 
conduct aimed at facilitating a CSA violation.  Providing even a 
routine legal service seems to cross this threshold.78  Because 
federal law does not recognize any form of commercial marijuana 
use, providing a transactional legal service likely reveals a 
lawyer’s specific intent to help a client violate federal marijuana 
law.  In other words, the lawyer herself would desire for her client 
to succeed in their plan to grow, possess, sell, or distribute 
marijuana.79 
Regardless of the standard of intent applied for a criminal 
conviction, lawyers wishing to avoid liability should refrain from 
encouraging clients to violate the CSA.80  They should also 
refrain from encouraging clients to engage in actions aimed at 
circumventing criminal prosecution.81  In order to avoid the 
appearance of intending to violate the CSA, a marijuana business 
attorney would need to limit her advice to informing clients about 
the legal consequences of their proposed courses of action.82  
Nevertheless, most of the legal services provided to an MRC stray 
far from this type of theoretical advice and would likely constitute 
proof of aiding and abetting liability.83 
C. CONSPIRACY LIABILITY
Conspiratorial liability is more far-reaching than aiding and 
abetting liability.  The federal conspiracy statute states that: 
76. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012).
78. See Olin, supra note 73, at 212 n.118 (noting that most accomplice liability cases
involving lawyers are those with attorneys engaged in transactional work). 
79. See, e.g., Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a
medical marijuana prescription written by a physician would reveal the physician’s “specific 
intent to provide a patient with the means to acquire marijuana.”).   
80. A. Claire Frezza, Counseling Clients on Medical Marijuana: Ethics Caught in
Smoke, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 552-53 (2012). 
81. Id. 
82. See Bruce E. Reinhart, Up in Smoke or Down in Flames? A Florida Lawyer’s
Legal and Ethical Risks in Advising a Marijuana Industry Client, 90 FLA. B.J. 21, 26 (2016). 
83. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 907. 
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[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United 
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any 
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect 
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.84 
In comparison to an aiding and abetting conviction, the 
finding of a conspiracy does not require that a principal party 
complete an underlying offense.85  Under the Pinkerton 
conspiracy liability doctrine, an attorney working with MRCs 
could be liable as a co-conspirator, as well as for the federal 
violation itself pursuant to the CSA.86  All that conspiracy liability 
requires is an agreement between the attorney and a client to 
commit a criminal offense.87 
An attorney likely enters a criminal conspiracy as soon as 
she agrees to perform a service in furtherance of an MRC’s 
legitimate business needs.88  Successive actions taken on behalf 
of the client will probably further the object of the client’s 
conspiracy, i.e., to commit an action in violation of the CSA.89  
As for the defendant’s state of mind, most jurisdictions require 
that a co-conspirator act with the purpose to bring about a criminal 
offense.90  As with aiding and abetting liability, performing even 
a routine legal service becomes problematic as an attorney helps 
a client acquire a stake in the success of a marijuana business.91  
For example, if a lawyer forms an attorney-client relationship 
with an MRC for the purpose of providing a transactional service, 
this would probably demonstrate strong evidence of culpable 
intent.92  Similarly, advice regarding administrative compliance 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
85. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (“The agreement to do
an unlawful act is . . . distinct from the doing of the act.”). 
86. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014).
87. United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). 
88. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
327, 358 (1998) 
89. Id. 
90. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 913 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)). 
91.  See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943) (“Petitioner’s
stake here was in making the profits which it knew could come only from its encouragement 
of Tate’s illicit operations.”).  
92. Id.
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on the state level would not escape the fact that the CSA trumps 
the existence of state marijuana regulatory regimes.93  
Accordingly, such services are likely to implicate conspiratorial 
liability and thus, provide a basis for criminal prosecution. 
D. TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND A LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
An attorney should tread with extreme caution when 
providing counsel to clients involved in the medical and 
recreational marijuana industries.  Even though the Rohrabacher 
Amendment provides an important limitation to the DOJ’s ability 
to prosecute medical marijuana cases, the risk of federal liability 
persists.  Many of the services provided during the attorney-client 
relationship are ongoing, which provides an extended basis for 
prosecutors to establish criminal liability.94  However, it is clear 
that the prospect of federal prosecution chills attorneys from 
rendering services to MRCs.95  This consideration is particularly 
troublesome when considering that lack of federal enforcement 
during the Obama Administration encouraged the growth of the 
commercial marijuana industry. 
Attorneys now face an ethical conundrum facilitated by 
federalism.  It is well established within the legal community that 
“[a] lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client’s . . . activities.”96  Even if an attorney 
93. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (holding that Congress possesses the
authority to regulate marijuana through the Commerce Clause); see also Waldon v. 
Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (stating that compliance 
with state law was not a proper defense for violating Title VII).  
94. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003).  In 
Hamilton, the Second Circuit upheld a police officer’s aiding and abetting conviction for 
providing protection to a crack house operation.  Id. at 173.  The Court held it was irrelevant 
that an illegal drug transaction did not occur before the officer spoke to a government 
informant.  Id. at 180.  Providing protection to the crack house constituted an ongoing 
activity.  Id.   
95. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. Prof’l Conduct., Adv. Op. No. 2016-6 (Aug. 5, 2016); Me. Bd.
of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available at 
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134 
[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics 
Comm’n, Op. 215 (2017) (available at http://www. 
Mebraoverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620 [https://perma.cc/ZMZ8-
RJSS]).   
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016). 
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learns of her client’s present or future criminal plans, the attorney 
is not obligated to disclose them.97  Instead, the attorney is 
obligated to refrain from facilitating clients’ present and future 
criminal enterprises,98 and she must withdraw from 
representations in violation of the law.99 
The ethical implications of representing an MRC remain 
ambiguous.  It is conceivable for an attorney to be prosecuted for 
representing a client when the client’s actions are in full 
compliance with state law.100  The attorney herself could fully 
comply with the applicable state ethics code,101 and the focus of 
the attorney’s efforts might center on determining the validity and 
application of existing marijuana laws.102  The prospect of 
criminal prosecution, however, is a powerful disincentive against 
representing MRCs.  Potential criminal liability creates a legal 
environment where attorneys are apprehensive to provide their 
services to an industry legitimized by state law and popular 
opinion.  Chilled representation inhibits a client’s ability to 
operate within the eyes of the law.  In a regulatory environment 
with sparse legal representation, MRCs would have little 
guidance in navigating existing laws.  Regulatory compliance in 
the commercial marijuana industry will require representation by 
an attorney.103  Despite the public’s growing acceptance of 
marijuana, government authorities will continue to maintain an 
interest in regulating when, where, and how marijuana can be 
manufactured and sold.  Chilled representation, therefore, is not 
desirable, especially as states continue to experiment with 
legalizing and regulating medical and recreational marijuana.104 
97. See id. at 1.6(a), (b).
98. See id. at 1.2(d).
99. Id. at 1.16(a)(1).
100. Hull, supra note 18, at 351.
101. See, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014). 
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, 
amended 2016). 
103. See Tarkington, supra note 26, at 61 (advocating an access-to-justice theory
where First Amendment protection would be provided when attorney speech is “essential to 
the proper functioning of . . . [the] justice system”).   
104. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE PROFESSIONAL
DEFERENCE STANDARD 
Perhaps the only effective defense for counseling MRCs is 
to rely on the professional deference standard.  This standard 
advocates judicial deference to professional state ethics rules.105  
The Supreme Court’s application of such deference is 
inconsistent,106 but prior case-law indicates that courts might be 
willing to hold that marijuana attorneys are obligated to advise 
clients in a competent manner, even when federal law conflicts 
with professional standards.107  This section will briefly analyze 
why attorney speech merits First Amendment protection.  Then, 
it will examine how the professional deference standard might 
operate by analyzing Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project.  
These cases did not address situations where federal and state law 
conflicted with one another, but similar to federal aiding or 
abetting and conspiracy laws, the relevant statutes operated in a 
way that restricted attorneys from rendering legal services to their 
clients. 
A. ATTORNEY ADVICE AS PROTECTED SPEECH
In response to state laws that have legalized medical or 
recreational marijuana, several state bar associations and ethics 
boards have liberalized Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.108  Liberalization ensures that an attorney 
does not violate her professional duties when representing MRCs 
so long as the attorney complies with applicable state law.109  The 
prospect of representing an MRC might pose a situation where 
lawyers are torn between their professional duties and their duty 
citizens chose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”).   
105. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (“The weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding 
the risk of deportation.”); but see Haupt, supra note 26, at 1281-82 (noting that courts have 
retreated from providing deference to professional norms in attorney advertising cases).  
106. See cases cited supra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text.
107. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 245-47
(2010); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002). 
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016); see, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014). 
109. See Brooks, supra note 36, at 23.
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to avoid criminal wrongdoing.110  So long as there is variation 
between the federal marijuana laws and professional codes of 
conduct, it appears possible that state ethics rules will not 
encompass current criminal law on the basis that the criminal law 
is too restrictive.111  However, when viewed alongside the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the criminal law might function 
as an external source of regulating the legal profession.  
Accordingly, it is possible for the criminal law to sanction 
conduct that would otherwise be permissible within the 
profession, i.e., permitted by accepted professional rules and 
standards.112 
When courts address situations where the criminal law 
regulates conduct in the legal profession, the Restatement on the 
Law of Governing Lawyers states that courts should consider 
“[t]he traditional and appropriate activities of a lawyer in 
representing a client in accordance with the requirements of the 
applicable lawyer code . . . .”113  Although professional codes do 
not supersede statutory law, the Restatement acknowledges the 
desirability to construe a criminal statute so as “to make it 
consistent with  . . . [the] applicable lawyer-code provision.”114  
The Restatement acknowledges that courts have “limited 
authority to interpret criminal provisions to accommodate 
professional norms.”115  It seems to presuppose that professional 
standards might provide a basis for how courts determine the 
scope of lawyer misconduct when evaluating violations of 
substantive law. 
The Supreme Court has expressed its willingness to provide 
some deference to professional legal standards when analyzing 
constitutional issues.116  In cases where a statute restricts a client’s 
110.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“[A] lawyer is guilty of an offense for an act committed in the course of representing 
a client to the same extent and on the same basis as would a nonlawyer acting similarly.”).  
111. See Green, supra note 88, at 391.
112. See Green, supra note 88, at 329.
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8 (AM. LAW INST.
2000). 
114. Id. at § 8 cmt. c.
115. Green, supra note 88, at 382.
116. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010) (“We long have
recognized that ‘[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .’ Although they 
are ‘only guides,’ and not ‘inexorable commands,’ these standards may be valuable measures 
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ability to challenge existing laws through prohibiting attorney 
advice or legal services, Supreme Court precedent seems to 
generally choose outcomes avoiding suppression of the advice or 
service.117  The current conflict between federal and state 
marijuana laws presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify 
how it can utilize professional standards in interpreting statutory 
bans on attorney advice and legal services.  More fundamentally, 
the conflict might present an opportunity to recognize advice 
rendered during the attorney-client relationship as a distinct form 
of speech protected by the First Amendment.118 
Despite the fact that the Court has not directly addressed 
whether attorney advice merits First Amendment protection, 
Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project scratched the surface of 
this issue.119  Both cases illustrated the possible impact that 
professional standards might have in determining the appropriate 
level of protection for legal advice.  Milavetz demonstrated the 
Court’s willingness to defer to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.120  On the other hand, Humanitarian Law Project 
produced a holding that contradicted the Model Rules.121  
Therefore, as demonstrated below, the level of deference placed 
on the Model Rules could play a critical role in determining the 
permissibility of an attorney advice prohibition.122 
B. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P.A. V. UNITED
STATES 
The Milavetz case involved regulations promulgated under a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).123  Under these regulations, 
of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation . . . .”) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Bobby v. Van Hook 
558 U.S. 4, 7-8 (2009)). 
117. See Knake, supra note 26, at 672; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 
U.S. 533, 549 (2001); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 428-29 (1963). 
118. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 98 (advocating a First Amendment standard that
protects advice rendered to an attorney’s clients). 
119. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 33.
120. See case cited supra Section II.B and accompanying text (emphasis added).
121. See case cited supra Section II.C and accompanying text.
122. See Knake, supra note 26, at 656. 
123.  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2010).
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a “debt relief agency”—a term that encompassed attorneys124—is 
precluded from advising clients to acquire additional debt before 
filing for bankruptcy.125  A law firm contended the prohibition 
comprised an unconstitutional restriction under the First 
Amendment.126  It argued that BAPCPA operated in a manner that 
would have prevented otherwise lawful and beneficial advice.127 
The Eighth Circuit agreed, noting that the ban prohibited 
attorneys from “advising any . . . person to incur any additional 
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy.”128  The court said the 
prohibition was not sufficiently tailored under the First 
Amendment because the prohibition banned beneficial 
bankruptcy advice not aimed at circumventing, abusing, or 
undermining bankruptcy laws.129  For example, beneficial advice 
could have included advising debtors to refinance a home 
mortgage to lower mortgage payments, or to incur additional debt 
so that a debtor may purchase a reliable vehicle.130  Such practices 
would not have harmed creditors in a menacing manner, and 
therefore, it was both lawful and advisable for debtors to acquire 
additional debt in these situations.131 
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision on grounds of statutory interpretation, 
not on a constitutional basis.132  The Court’s analysis concluded 
that BAPCPA adequately protected attorney-client discussions 
when clients possessed valid reasons for incurring additional 
debt.133  The prohibition against advising clients to incur 
additional debt only applied to advice that recommended debtors 
124. A “debt relief agency” included “any person who provides any bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2012).  
125. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233.
126. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2008). 
127.  See Brief for Petitioners at 24, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States,
559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
128. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 793 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 794. 
130. Id. at 793-94.
131. Id. 
132. See Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 248 
(2010). Because the Court evaluated the restriction as a matter of statutory interpretation, it 
did not consider the provision’s First Amendment implications.  Id.  
133.  Id. at 243 (concluding the statute prohibited acquiring more debt because of one’s
status as a debtor, as opposed to a valid purpose). 
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acquire more debt because they were about to file for 
bankruptcy.134 
Even if statutory interpretation did not resolve the issue of 
whether BAPCPA prohibited beneficial legal advice, the Court 
suggested in dicta that it would have reached the same conclusion 
based on what comprises an attorney’s professional 
obligations.135  The Court indicated that interpreting the 
prohibition as inconsistent with Model Rule 1.2(d) “serves no 
conceivable purpose within [BAPCPA’s] statutory scheme.”136  
The Model Rule states that attorneys cannot counsel and assist 
their clients to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity.137  In a 
footnote, the Court said that reading the prohibition to forbid 
lawful advice would have seriously undermined the attorney-
client relationship and the discussion inherent in such a 
relationship.138 
In sum, the Supreme Court looked to professional standards 
in examining a prohibition on attorney speech.139  Specifically, 
the Court indicated its willingness to defer to the Model Rules as 
guidance for determining the scope of an attorney’s professional 
duties when those duties were framed by BAPCPA’s statutory 
scheme.140  But shortly after the Milavetz decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed course and declined to defer to professional 
standards when presented with another situation that involved a 
prohibition on attorney advice.141 
C. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,142 the Court 
examined a statute that imposed criminal punishment on anyone 
who provided “‘material support . . .’ to certain foreign 
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 246. 
136. Id.; see also Knake, supra note 26, at 651-52; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended 2016). 
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016). 
138. Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246 n.5
(2010). 
139. Haupt, supra note 26, at 1263.
140. Id. 
141. Supra Section II.C and accompanying text.
142. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 1 (2010). 
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organizations that engage in terrorist activity.”143  The issue in 
this case was whether legal services provided by Humanitarian 
Law Project (“HLP”) amounted to such “material support.”144  
HLP was a human rights organization that sought to help the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil (“LTTE”) utilize international law to negotiate peace 
agreements.145  The material support statute applied to the PKK 
and LTTE because both groups were designated as foreign 
terrorist organizations (“FTOs”) by the United States Department 
of State.146 
In contrast to its approach in Milavetz, the Court analyzed 
the material support prohibition as a First Amendment issue.147  
The statute did not prohibit generalized, non-specialized advice 
to FTOs.148  Instead, it barred providing specialized knowledge, 
such as how to petition the United Nations, or how to utilize 
international law.149  Although the Court applied a First 
Amendment standard that was “more demanding” than “the kind 
of intermediate . . .  standard” that applies to non-speech 
restrictions,150 it concluded the material support prohibition did 
not violate HLP’s freedom of speech.151 
Unsuccessfully, HLP attempted to distinguish advice that 
was meaningful and legitimate under federal law, as opposed to 
advice that undermined the government’s interest in countering 
terrorism.152  This argument is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Milavetz, which demonstrated that the Court 
was unwilling to interpret BAPCPA in a way that prohibited 
otherwise lawful legal advice, i.e., advice that would not have 
143. Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012)).
144. Id. at 11. 
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. Id. at 9. 
147. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27-28.
148. Id.  As applied to HLP, the Court concluded that the material support provisions
barred “training” PKK and LTTE members on how to use humanitarian and international 
law, as well as providing “expert advice or assistance” to these groups.  Id. at 21-22.  
149. Id. at 27.
150. Id. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In O’Brien, the Court
established a First Amendment test addressing situations where the government attempts to 
regulate something other than speech, but the effect of the restriction incidentally affects 
speech.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).   
151. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010).
152. Id. at 29. 
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abused the protections of the bankruptcy system.153  The material 
support statute prohibited unthreatening, beneficial advice with 
respect to its ban on providing services intended to help FTOs.154  
Despite similarities as to how these provisions affected attorney 
advice, the Court agreed with the government.155  It concluded 
that services aimed at promoting peaceful activities might further 
terrorism through legitimizing FTOs within the public sphere.156 
Justice Breyer’s dissent appreciated the consequence of the 
Court’s failure to recognize a line between lawful advice and 
advice that aided a client’s criminal activity.157  He noted that the 
Court’s ruling produced a “chill[ing]” effect on counseling these 
organizations—that it permitted criminalizing speech that would 
have otherwise received First Amendment protection.158  
Regardless of this reasoning, the Court’s majority held that the 
material support statute did not violate HLP’s freedom of 
speech.159  Rather than distinguishing between advice that an 
attorney could and could not render, Humanitarian Law Project 
upheld a ban that conclusively prohibited and criminalized the 
formation of the attorney-client relationship between an attorney 
and a designated FTO.160  Deference to Model Rule 1.2(d) would 
have meant legal advice pertaining to the lawful use of 
international law and humanitarian aid should have been 
protected.161  In the majority opinion, however, Justice Roberts 
emphasized the narrow application of the Court’s holding.162  He 
153. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246 
(2010). 
154. See Knake, supra note 26, at 713. 
155. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30-39.
156. Id. at 30.  The Court noted several examples.  The existence of HLP’s legal
services might strain the United States’ relations with its allies and consequently undermine 
international efforts to combat terrorism.  Id. at 32.  Likewise, HLP’s capability to provide 
advice to FTOs might allow these groups to take advantage of legitimate legal services for 
illicit objectives, e.g., the PKK could utilize peace negotiations as a means to buy time for 
short-term military setbacks; the LTTE might redirect tsunami-related aid to violent 
activities.  Id. at 37.   
157. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40-41 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
158. Id. at 27, 50, 55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 38. 
160. See 18 U.S.C. §2339B (2012); see also Tarkington, supra note 26, at 79. 
161. Knake, supra note 26, at 656.  Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits counseling clients in
a way that furthers criminal or fraudulent conduct.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended 2016).
162. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.
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stated that future applications of the material support statute 
might not survive First Amendment scrutiny.163  He also 
suggested that a similar prohibition might not extend to advice 
offered to domestic organizations.164 
III. THE PROFESSIONAL DEFERENCE STANDARD
AND MARIJUANA BUSINESS ATTORNEYS
As lawyers, speech is our stock in trade . . . . Our tools are 
books and not saws or scalpels. Our product is argument, 
persuasion, negotiation, and documentation, so speaking (by 
which I include writing) is not only central to what the legal 
system is all about, and not only the product of law as we know 
it, but basically the only thing that lawyers and the legal system 
have.165 
Questions surrounding the constitutional parameters of 
attorney advice linger following the Milavetz and Humanitarian 
Law Project decisions.166  Humanitarian Law Project 
acknowledged that the legal profession receives some degree of 
First Amendment protection.167 Unfortunately, neither Milavetz 
nor Humanitarian Law Project provided helpful guidance on how 
to address statutory provisions that limit the availability of legal 
advice.168  The Milavetz decision was consistent with and 
deferential to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.169  
Humanitarian Law Project provided a holding inconsistent with 
the Model Rules.170 
The notion that deference can be provided to professional 
ethical standards should be implicit in recognizing attorney 
advice as a category of protected speech.171  A constitutional 
163. Id.
164. Id. 
165. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and The Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 
687, 688 (1997).  
166. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 639, 656 (2011). 
167. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
168. Knake, supra note 26, at 656.
169. Supra Section II.B.
170. Supra Section II.C.
171. See Knake, supra note 26, at 683-84 (2011) (“[A]n appreciation of the ABA
standards is important not only because they reveal how legislative advice bans compromise 
the duties and obligations demanded by the attorney-client relationship, but because those 
standards can offer a meaningful measure of constitutional rights.”); Haupt, supra note 26, 
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protection for attorney speech might be necessary to ensure that 
marijuana businesses can make a good faith effort in attempting 
to invoke or avoid the authority of the law.172  Judicial deference 
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct would provide a basis 
for attorneys to represent these clients. 
Within states that have legalized medical or recreational 
marijuana, several professional ethics bodies have responded to 
legalization by limiting Model Rule 1.2(d)’s application to 
violations of state law.173  For example, Arizona’s Ethics 
Commission has stated: 
[W]e decline to interpret and apply ER 1.2(d) in a manner
that would prevent a lawyer who concludes that the client’s 
proposed conduct is in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with 
state law from assisting the client in connection with activities 
expressly authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of 
the very legal advice and assistance that is needed to engage in 
the conduct that the state law expressly permits.174 
In states similar to Arizona, attorneys who are in compliance 
with state law are professionally protected from representing 
marijuana businesses.  Federal marijuana law, however, prohibits 
them from providing services that would otherwise be legal.175  
Due to this fact, several state ethics boards within medical 
marijuana jurisdictions have been reluctant to liberalize Rule 
1.2(d) because of the prospect that an attorney could incur 
criminal liability under federal law.176 
at 1241-42 (contending for a First Amendment standard protecting professional speech based 
on deference to professional institutions, i.e., knowledge communities); William T. 
Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California 
State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 489 (1995) (pointing out that lawyers “alone have the 
specialized knowledge to understand the unique nature of their profession’s problems and 
hence, to apply effective cures”).  
172. See Tarkington, supra note 26, at 84 (stating that an access-to-justice theory
justifies First Amendment protection for attorney speech). 
173. See, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014) (emphasis 
added). 
174. State Bar of Ariz. R. of Prof’l Conduct Comm’n, Formal Op. 11-01 (2011)
(available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=710 
[https://perma.cc/5Y6Q-LH56]) (internal quotations omitted). 
175. Supra Sections I.B and I.C and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Prof’l Conduct Comm., Informal Op. 2016-6
(2016); Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available 
at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134 
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Criminalizing an attorney’s ability to represent an MRC 
ignores the reality that states have elected to undertake a bold 
experiment in federalism—and that the federal government has 
been permissive in allowing these states to proceed.  Because of 
the fact that states are unlikely to reverse course on medical and 
recreational marijuana, significant policy concerns justify a 
solution to the issue of MRC representation.  A constitutional 
protection for attorneys representing MRCs would provide clarity 
to the issue of marijuana representation.177  A standard reliant on 
judicial deference to professional norms is ideal. 
Members of a profession maintain interests in speaking in a 
manner consistent with the values and standards of the 
profession.178  Conceivably, a professional deference standard 
that protects marijuana business attorneys would contain two key 
features.  First, it would entail deference to state rules of 
professional conduct as a way to protect attorneys within medical 
or recreational marijuana jurisdictions from federal prosecution.  
Second, it would only apply when attorneys are in compliance 
with applicable state laws and ethics rules. 
Most likely, a constitutional standard reliant on professional 
deference would encourage state bar associations and ethics 
boards to proceed with rulemaking in a manner consistent with 
state law.179  The standard would also balance an attorney’s role 
as a representative of his client’s interests, as well as his role as 
an officer of the legal system.180  A professional deference 
standard, moreover, would recognize the need to resolve 
questions on when a statute can impose a prohibition on attorney 
[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics 
Comm’n, Op. 215 (2017) (available at http://www. 
Mebraoverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620 [https://perma.cc/ZMZ8-
RJSS]). 
177. See Knake, supra note 26, at 645 (noting that there is not a clear standard
protecting attorney advice). 
178. Haupt, supra note 26, at 1272-73 (“The professional speaker has a unique
autonomy interest in communicating her message according to the standards of the 
profession to which she belongs, precisely in order to uphold the integrity of its knowledge 
community. Physicians, for instance, should not be compelled to speak in a way that 
undermines their profession’s scientific insights.”).   
179. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 36.
180. Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 931.
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advice and legal services.181  Federal criminal law prohibits 
marijuana business attorneys from engaging in services that might 
be consistent with applicable professional norms and rules of 
conduct.182  Currently, attorneys are prohibited from rendering 
otherwise lawful advice, i.e., they cannot lawfully provide routine 
legal services when state law permits them to do so.  There exists 
a strong interest in minimizing the discrepancy between a 
lawyer’s legal obligations and her professional duties.  Adoption 
of the professional deference standard would ensure that a 
marijuana business attorney could operate within the eyes of the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The professional deference standard might function as a 
potential defense for circumventing federal liability.  Judicial 
deference to state rules of conduct might limit liability with regard 
to providing routine legal services.  Furthermore, adoption of the 
professional deference standard might help courts delineate 
distinctions between permissible and impermissible services 
rendered on behalf of MRCs.183 
At this point in time, the author cautions readers from relying 
on the First Amendment as a mechanism for protecting attorney 
advice.  It is practically certain that most routine legal services 
provided to MRCs cross the line into aiding or abetting and 
conspiracy liability.  Deference to professional standards is by no 
means a definitive principle to rely on.  While Milavetz illustrated 
that the Supreme Court was willing to provide deference to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Humanitarian Law Project 
ruled contrary to the Model Rules when the Court reviewed 
another attorney advice prohibition.  The Court’s inconsistency, 
therefore, demonstrates that the First Amendment and 
professional deference is an imperfect defense to federal liability.  
Notwithstanding this consideration, such an argument is quite 
181. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246-47
(2010); but see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34, 36, 39 (2010). 
182. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“All the activities [at issue] involve the communication and advocacy of political ideas and 
lawful means of achieving political ends.”). See also Green, supra note 88, at 391.   
183. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1034.
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possibly the only realistic defense for attorneys wishing to 
represent marijuana business entities. 
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